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Technological Neutrality:
(Pre)Serving the Purposes of  
Copyright Law
carys j. craig
1. introduction
In the realm of law, neutrality is widely hailed as a fundamental 
principle of fairness, justice and equity; it is also, however, widely 
criticized as a myth that too often obscures the inevitable reality of 
perspective, interest or agenda. It should come as little surprise, then, 
that the principle of technological neutrality, recently employed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada when applying copyright law to online 
activities, seems similarly fundamental in the copyright realm—but 
also largely mythical and potentially obfuscatory. In what is now 
dubbed the Supreme Court’s “copyright pentalogy”—five copyright 
judgments released concurrently by the Court in July 20121—the 
unprecedented importance accorded by the Court to the principle 
of technological neutrality is clear; what remains unclear is precisely 
what “technological neutrality” means, why it matters, and whether 
or how it can (or should) ever be attained. 
This chapter aims to critically assess the significance of the prin-
ciple and its potential to guide the future development of copyright 
law and policy in Canada. In Part 2, I set out the various shades of 
meaning that can be attached to technological neutrality, first as a 
9
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principle of sound regulation, and then as a principle of statutory 
interpretation by the courts. I review, in Part 3, the reasons delivered 
by the Justices in three of the five cases to examine the various and 
divergent ways in which the principle of technological neutrality was 
defined and rationalized by members of the Court. I proceed to explore 
the application of the principle and its role in resolving the legal issues 
before the Court, drawing connections between conceptualizations of 
the principle and its interpretive impact, and focusing on its capacity 
to support the extension and/or circumscription of owners’ and users’ 
rights. In Part 4, I consider whether the role accorded to technological 
neutrality as a guiding principle is justifiable or appropriate in the 
context of Canadian copyright policy. Arguing that its justification is 
found in, and flows from, the concept of balance at the heart of the 
copyright system, I proceed to offer some thoughts on its potential 
significance in the future of Canadian copyright law and in light of 
the recent amendments to the Copyright Act.2 Part 5 concludes that 
the new emphasis placed by the Court on technological neutrality 
as a guiding principle is an important and positive development for 
Canada’s copyright system. The caveat, however, is that the principle 
cannot perform this role effectively if conceived (or rhetorically 
invoked) as a limited principle of formal non-discrimination that 
merely justifies the extension of copyright’s reach. Rather, I argue, it 
must be conceived in a functional sense, shaping copyright norms to 
produce a substantively equivalent effect across technologies, with a 
view to preserving the copyright balance in the digital realm. 
 2.  Understanding Technological Neutrality and its shades  
of Meaning 
2.1  Technological Neutrality as a Regulatory Starting Point
Technological neutrality is an inherently appealing concept for 
policy makers in the digital age. At its core, the concept implies that 
regulations can and should be developed in such a way that they are 
independent of any particular technology, neither favouring nor 
discriminating against specific technologies as they emerge and evolve. 
From a principled perspective, neutrality and non-discrimination in 
the law are almost always laudable goals; from a practical perspective, 
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technologically neutral regulation holds the promise of sustainable 
laws in a time of rapid technological change. No doubt owing to this 
intrinsic appeal, the principle of technological neutrality is regularly 
invoked as a regulatory starting point in policy documents from 
around the globe,3 but typically with little explanation or justification. 
This led one commentator to align technological neutrality with 
“motherhood and apple pie”4—the general wisdom being that it is an 
unquestionably good thing. Professor Reed rightly cautions that “this 
consensus among legislators seems to have developed in an almost 
complete absence of any clear understanding [of] what the term 
‘technology neutrality’ might actually mean.”5 In fact, technological 
neutrality has many shades of meaning, and, of course, different 
meanings can produce differing applications with more or less 
desirable results. Before we embark on understanding the significance 
of the principle as invoked by the Supreme Court, it is therefore worth 
exploring the various ways in which it might be employed.
Bert-Jaap Koops has expertly deconstructed the claim (or “policy 
one-liner”) that ICT regulation should be technology neutral, helping 
us to discern the divergent meanings and potential uses of the 
term.6 Koops explains that usages can be divided into three broad 
categories: those emphasizing (A) the purpose of regulation; (B) the 
consequences of regulation; and (C) legislative technique. Within 
each of these categories, Koops identifies two or more approaches, 
which are closely interrelated but stress different aspects of technology 
neutrality. 
Focusing on the substantive purpose of regulation, one 
approach (A1) stresses the need to regulate functions and effects 
of actions (technology uses), but not the actions or means of the 
actions (the technologies) themselves. This functional approach 
produces regulation that is intended to be technology neutral in its 
effects (though it may be technology-specific where the effects of 
technologies differ).7 A second and related purposive approach (A2) 
emphasizes that what holds offline should also hold online, with the 
goal of establishing functional equivalence between the online and 
offline worlds (and, again, different treatment of specific technologies 
may be necessary to realize equivalent results).8 
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A less substantive approach to technological neutrality focuses on 
avoiding potential negative consequences of regulation. One version 
(B1) stresses non-discrimination between certain technologies so that 
the rules do not favour some technologies over others. Related to this, 
a second version (B2) starts with the position that regulation should 
not hamper the development of technologies. This, too, can justify 
technology-specific regulation, where uniform rules might inhibit 
new technologies (for example, the decision not to extend traditional 
broadcasting content regulations to the Internet).
Finally, emphasizing legislative technique, another approach 
to technological neutrality derives from basic principles of law-
making. First, it might be stressed (C1) that effective laws should be 
sustainable and not constantly in flux as technologies change. The 
extent to which consistency in function or effect can be achieved over 
time and in the face of rapid technological change is, of course, open 
to challenge. A related starting point (C2) is that formal laws should 
be sustainable while other forms of regulation can more appropriately 
be used to further technology-specific aims. An alternative starting 
point in the same vein (C3) might stress that the law should be 
transparent and readily understood by those who are subject to it. 
The more technologically specific the rules, the more detailed and the 
less accessible they become (as anyone who has taken even a cursory 
glance at Canada’s new Copyright Modernization Act would likely 
attest!). 
For the purposes of what follows, the approaches identified by 
Koops can be broadly classified into those concerned primarily 
with a functional approach to copyright law (producing equivalent 
effect across technologies); the potential discriminatory or adverse 
consequences of copyright on technological development; and 
the “future-proofing” of copyright law. Importantly, none of these 
approaches necessarily entails neutrality in the sense of a formal 
equality that would preclude differentiation between technologies by 
the law; rather, different treatment can be justified as substantively 
technology neutral where overlooking technical differences would 
produce unequal results. 
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2.2  Technological Neutrality as a Judicial Approach
If these various approaches describe the starting point for the 
development of technology-neutral regulation, what should 
technological neutrality mean for the judiciary and others charged 
with interpreting and applying the law? While Koops’s concern 
is with regulatory practice, he acknowledges that one strategy for 
achieving technological neutrality is for laws to be interpreted in a 
functionalist or teleological way, according more importance to their 
purpose than their precise form.9 Even where the laws as written are 
technologically specific, Koops suggests that technological neutrality 
can be advanced through their functional interpretation. The capacity 
for such teleological interpretation is enhanced, Koops notes, by the 
establishment of a legal framework that outlines the main substantive 
principles, rights and values that are at stake.10 Such a framework is, 
by nature, technology neutral and supports a functional approach to 
the application of specific rules.
In a similar vein, but focusing specifically on the role of courts in 
maintaining the media neutrality of copyright law, Deborah Tussey 
articulates three “rules-of-thumb” to keep courts “on a media-neutral 
keel.”11 First, where statutory guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts 
should generally afford functionally equivalent technologies similar 
treatment unless there is a compelling doctrinal or policy reason that 
dictates otherwise. Tussey explains, “To the extent that the copyright 
balance of incentives and access has been appropriately set for a 
pre-existing technology, similar treatment of functional equivalents 
should maintain that balance.”12 Second, where there is no clear and 
pre-existing functional equivalent, courts should avoid emphasizing 
the details of particular technological systems and instead interpret 
copyright’s core concepts in a manner applicable across technologies. 
A good example of this approach is found in the judicial treatment of 
software infringement claims that invoke basic concepts of originality, 
idea-expression dichotomy, merger and scènes à faire to determine 
if substantial copying of code has occurred.13 Finally, courts should 
give more weight to broader policy considerations such as fairness, 
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incentives and innovation, as well as related empirical evidence, in 
determining how the law should apply to new technologies: “the 
application of text to technology should be accompanied by full and 
fair review of policy concerns and consideration of likely market 
impacts.”14
The concept of technological or media neutrality has in fact 
made quite frequent appearances in the copyright jurisprudence of 
several common law jurisdictions, but unfortunately without much 
elucidation of its meaning, or explanation as to why, or the extent 
to which, it matters. In the United States, media neutrality has been 
described as “a fundamental principle of the Copyright Act,” and has 
been endorsed by the Supreme Court as a relevant consideration in 
determining the scope of copyright, particularly in the context of 
collective works.15 The principle has remained closely tied to the idea 
(C1) that the 1976 US legislation was intentionally “future-proofed,” 
with the result that the rights it protects are generally not technology 
specific.16 The uncontroversial nature of this basic and rather benign 
proposition has allowed the principle to remain largely beyond 
critique.17 In the United Kingdom, the legislative intention to achieve 
technological neutrality has been taken into account in determining 
the broad scope of the “communication to the public” right.18 The 
concept has received more extensive consideration in the Australian 
courts, where a declared objective of the copyright law revision 
process was “to replace technology-specific rights with technology 
neutral rights so that amendments to the Act are not needed each time 
there is a development in technology.”19 As in the United Kingdom, 
the principle has been invoked to support the inclusion of point-
to-multipoint transmissions within the right of “communication to 
the public.”20 In a recent case, the full Federal Court referred more 
generally to “the desirability of technological neutrality—of not 
limiting rights and defences to technologies known at the time when 
those rights and defences were enacted.”21 The Court also explicitly 
limited the significance of the principle, however, stating: “It is not for 
this Court to re-draft [a] provision to secure an assumed legislative 
desire for such [technological] neutrality.”22 
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 3.  Technological Neutrality before the supreme Court of 
Canada
3.1 Media Neutrality in Robertson v Thomson 
While the term “media neutrality” had previously surfaced in 
Canada’s courts,23 it was in the 2006 case of Robertson v Thomson that 
the Supreme Court first explicitly addressed its significance in the 
copyright context.24 The reasons offered by the split bench in Robertson 
merit attention as a harbinger of what subsequently unfolded in the 
2012 decisions. 
The majority in Robertson found that reproduction of the Globe 
& Mail newspaper in an electronic database caused the original 
compilation work to be “fragmented, submerged, overwhelmed 
and lost”,25 with the result that the database was found to reproduce 
the individual articles as opposed to the newspaper per se, thereby 
potentially infringing the copyright of freelance authors in their 
works. The dissenting Justices invoked the concept of media neutrality 
to stress the functional equivalence of the electronic database with an 
electronic archive, itself akin to a traditional library: 
If media neutrality is to have any meaning, it must 
permit the publishers to convert their daily print edition 
into electronic form…. [T]his electronic edition…is a 
reproduction of the print edition in electronic form. 
That is precisely what media neutrality protects. … The 
analysis is unchanged if a number of these hypothetical 
electronic editions are collected together. This is simply 
the electronic analogy to stacking print editions of a 
newspaper on a shelf.26
The majority was criticized for its concern with the form rather 
than the substance of the database on the grounds that this was 
“inconsistent with the media neutral approach mandated by s 3 of the 
Copyright Act.”27
The principle of media neutrality was, however, explicitly 
acknowledged by all members of the Court. The majority judgment 
recognized that “[m]edia neutrality is reflected in s 3(1) of the 
Copyright Act which describes a right to produce or reproduce a work 
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‘in any material form whatever,’”28 and emphasized that the Justices 
were “mindful of the principle”29 in arriving at their conclusion. The 
difference between the majority and minority application of media 
neutrality to the legal issue at hand can be at least partly explained, 
however, by the divergent characterizations of the principle and the 
significance attributed to it. 
The majority defined media neutrality as meaning that “the 
Copyright Act should continue to apply in different media, including 
more technologically advanced ones.”30 This approach is focused on 
non-discrimination between different technologies (in the sense of 
Koops’s meaning B2), and is thus limited where differences between 
media produce legally significant differences in effect. The majority 
found that the electronic database was not simply an equivalent, if 
more effective, technical alternative to the traditional or even electronic 
archiving of individual issues, such that “focusing exclusively on 
input in the name of media neutrality takes the principle too far and 
ultimately, turns it on its head.”31 Given that the principle “exists to 
protect the rights of authors and others as technology evolves,” the 
majority insisted that media neutrality “is not a license to override the 
rights of authors.”32 
The minority accorded media neutrality a somewhat different 
significance. Similarly taking as a starting point the section 3(1) 
right to reproduce the work “in any material form,” the minority 
stressed that “[t]he concept of media neutrality is how Parliament 
chose to come to grips with potential technological developments”33 
(consistent with meaning C1). The minority’s emphasis on the 
functional equivalence of electronic and traditional archiving 
further invokes technical neutrality in the sense of regulating effects 
rather than means (A1) and achieving equivalency between offline 
and online activities (A2). But what comes through clearly in the 
dissenting reasons—and particularly in the passages that speak to 
the potential of new technologies—is the commitment to a principle 
of media neutrality attentive primarily to the purpose of the law 
(in the sense of meaning A, generally). Thus, the minority analysis 
begins by observing that section 3(1) of the Copyright Act has been 
substantially unchanged since 1921, just after “the first domestic 
radio sets, and many decades before the technological revolution 
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that produced, among other innovations, online databases.”34 The 
reasons proceed directly to a description of the overarching purposes 
of copyright, as articulated by the Court in the case of Théberge v 
Galérie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc.: “promoting the public interest 
in the encouragement and dissemination of artistic and intellectual 
works, and justly rewarding the creator of the work.”35 Tasked with 
maintaining an appropriate balance between these goals, the minority 
notes the significance of the public interest in the availability of 
archived newspapers.36 The link between the public purposes of 
copyright and the public interest in new technologies is brought to 
the fore in the following passage, which hints at how a purposive 
construction of copyright law aligns with a functional conception of 
technological neutrality: 
The Copyright Act was designed to keep pace with 
technological developments to foster intellectual, artistic 
and cultural creativity. In applying the Copyright Act 
to a realm that includes the Internet and the databases 
at issue in this case, courts face unique challenges, 
but in confronting them, the public benefits of this 
digital universe should be kept prominently in view. As 
Professor Michael Geist observes:
The Internet and new technologies have unleashed a 
remarkable array of new creativity, empowering millions 
of individuals to do more than just consume our culture, 
instead enabling them to actively and meaningfully 
participate in it.37 
The divergence between the minority and majority rulings 
in Robertson reveals the importance of the particular meaning or 
emphasis given to the principle of technological neutrality, and the 
bearing that this has on the results that the principle will produce. 
It also suggests, however, that even following the rules of thumb for 
media-neutral interpretations of the law could produce significantly 
different results depending on the assumptions that are brought to 
bear at any stage of the analysis. 
Consider again Tussey’s first rule of thumb, that “where statutory 
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guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts should afford functionally 
equivalent technologies similar treatment.”38 In any case, particularly 
one involving new technologies, reasonable people may differ on the 
question of whether the law is actually clear or ambiguous, and on 
whether it is directly applicable as written or effectively silent given the 
technical specificities at issue. Opinions might also differ on whether 
an analogy to a pre-existing technology is apt or inappropriate, 
and whether technical functions are substantively equivalent or 
significantly different in nature or scope. Turning to Tussey’s second 
rule, that judges should focus on core copyright concepts rather 
than technical particularities, the core concepts of copyright law are 
famously fluid, subjective and malleable, with the result that they are 
often more useful to rationalize a conclusion than they are helpful 
in producing one. The concept of “substantial reproduction” at issue 
in Robertson, for example, provides little guidance in determining 
how much copying is too much in any particular case (as do the 
attendant concepts of “recognizability” and “essential or vital part”), 
and caused apparent confusion when applied to determine the scope 
of the owner’s right in a compilation.39 Finally, taking Tussey’s third 
suggestion that greater regard be had to policy considerations, given 
the controversy over copyright’s policy and how they ought to be 
balanced, this interpretive approach will inevitably produce different 
results depending on the policy perspective brought to bear by the 
decision maker. It is evident, for example, that the majority’s analysis 
in Robertson was guided by a concern with protecting the rights of 
authors in the digital realm, while the minority was somewhat more 
concerned with protecting the public interest in accessing the works 
at issue. 
The point I mean to make is that even a common or overlapping 
understanding of technological neutrality, coupled with a shared 
commitment to advancing a technologically neutral interpretation 
of the law, can produce very different results when law is applied in 
particular contexts. Ultimately, what matters is how decision makers 
understand the law as written, the technology as used, the core 
copyright concepts at play, and, most importantly, the larger legal 
framework—the rights and values at stake in the copyright balance. 
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3.2  Conceptions of Technological Neutrality in the Copyright 
Pentalogy
The principle of technological neutrality made a decisive appearance 
in three of the five judgments released by the Court in summer 2012: 
Rogers, ESA and Bell. This section will provide an overview of these 
cases, assessing the role played by the principle in the reasoning of the 
Court. To begin, however, it is helpful to pull back and consider the 
various definitions of, and rationales for, technological neutrality that 
were offered in the rulings.
 3.2.1 A Minimalist Approach 
The narrowest formulation of the principle is found in the 
dissenting judgment of Rothstein J in ESA, which adopted the 
statement of LeBel and Fish JJ writing for the majority in Robertson: 
“Media neutrality means that the Copyright Act should continue to 
apply in different media, including more technologically advanced 
ones…. Media neutrality is not a license to override the rights of 
authors—it exists to protect the rights of authors and others as 
technology evolves.”40 As in Robertson, this statement reflects a 
restrictive vision of technological neutrality as concerned only with 
non-discrimination between technological means in a formalistic 
sense: the law remains applicable across different technologies. The 
emphasis is, again, not on the effect of the law as such, but on its 
capacity to apply in new and unanticipated contexts. To the extent that 
broader public policy concerns are considered, the concern appears 
to be with the continued recognition and protection of authors’ or 
owners’ rights. 
This restrictive version of the neutrality principle coincides with 
a similarly constrained vision of its appropriate role in shaping the 
interpretation of the law. Continuing in the formalist vein, Rothstein 
J writes: “A media neutral application of the Act…does not imply that 
a court can depart from the ordinary meaning of the words of the 
Act in order to achieve the level of protection for copyright holders 
that the court considers is adequate.”41 The minority is prepared to 
acknowledge that “[g]enerally, a technologically neutral copyright 
law is desirable.”42 Neutrality is cast here as a typical baseline, an 
282   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
appropriate default position that might be sound, but from which the 
law may readily depart: regarded in this way, it is far from a standard 
against which the law ought to be measured, nor even a goal to which 
the lawmakers—or those tasked with applying the law—should aspire. 
The minority’s depiction of the principle of technological neutrality 
minimizes its potential to legitimately inform, and certainly to 
determine, how the law should be interpreted and applied. 
What was essentially the position of the majority in Robertson 
became the minority approach to technological neutrality in ESA. By 
the same token, as we will see, the majority position in ESA echoes and 
builds upon the dissenting reasons in Robertson. Before we get there, 
however, it is useful to consider the approach taken by the Court to 
technological neutrality in its unanimous judgment in the Bell and 
Rogers cases, which represent, in my view, intermediate approaches 
to the principle, somewhere in between that of the minority and 
majority in ESA.
 3.2.2 An Intermediate Approach 
In Bell, Abella J references technological neutrality as a “goal,” 
and explains that the principle “seeks to have the Copyright Act 
applied in a way that operates consistently, regardless of the form of 
media involved, or its technological sophistication.”43 Interestingly, 
the majority ruling in Robertson is cited in support of this statement. 
When we consider Koops’s shades of meaning, however, we can see 
a subtle but potentially important difference between the definition 
offered here by Abella J, and that of Fish and LeBel JJ in Robertson. 
Whereas the Robertson majority wrote that “[m]edia neutrality 
means that the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different 
media,”44 Abella J emphasizes that it should be applied “in a way that 
operates consistently.” The emphasis is not on non-discrimination 
between technologies in a formal sense (B1), but rather on substantive 
equivalence of effect when the law is applied across different 
technologies. Put another way, the formulation offered by Abella J 
and accepted by the full bench in Bell hints at a more functional and 
effects-oriented vision of technological neutrality (A1).
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In Rogers, in reasons written by Rothstein J, the discussion of 
technological neutrality is largely tied, as one might anticipate, to the 
idea of the law’s “continued relevance in an evolving technological 
environment,”45 and the extension of the Act, “where possible,” to 
technologies that “were not or could not have been contemplated at 
the time of its drafting.”46 What is interesting here, however, is the 
link drawn between the concept of media neutrality and the idea of 
copyright as a balance between the public interest and authors’ just 
rewards.47 Rothstein J draws the connection when he notes that the 
copyright balance “is not appropriately struck where the existence of 
copyright protection depends merely on the business model” chosen; 
whether conveying content through traditional or new media, he 
notes, “the end result is the same.”48 Thus we have, in Rogers, a vision 
of technological neutrality articulated by Rothstein J and endorsed 
by seven members of the bench49 that captures the more substantive 
concern with the equivalent effect of technology in light of the 
law’s purpose. That said, the emphasis remains on the protection of 
copyright (and so of copyright owners) across technologies, where 
consistent with the clear wording of the Act.50
 3.2.3 An Expansive Approach 
We can envisage the principle of technological neutrality along a 
conceptual spectrum: at one end, it is a limited principle of formal non-
discrimination between technologies; at the other end, it is a broad 
and substantive principle that informs a teleological interpretation of 
the law. With each articulation of the principle so far, we have inched 
further along the spectrum. It is with the majority’s judgment in the 
ESA case, I suggest, that we reach the most expansive version of the 
principle.
Abella and Moldaver JJ begin with a simple but substantive 
expression of technological neutrality as requiring “that the Copyright 
Act apply equally between traditional and more technologically 
advanced forms of the same media.”51 Again, the emphasis is on 
functional equivalence and consistency in effect. The majority stresses 
that, when works are downloaded, the Internet is a delivery system—a 
“technological taxi”52—no different in function or effect from a store 
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clerk or a courier putting a copy of the work in the hands of the end 
user. A purposive approach to technological neutrality emphasizing 
function and effect (A1) therefore requires that equivalent delivery 
methods receive equal treatment by the law (consistent with the idea, 
in the sense of A2, that what holds offline should also hold online). 
What sets the majority’s ruling apart, however, is the explicit 
connection drawn between this functional approach and copyright’s 
policy balance, with the statement that “[t]he traditional balance 
between authors and users should be preserved in the digital 
environment.”53 This resonates with Professor Tussey’s assertion that 
where copyright has struck an appropriate balance in traditional 
media, “similar treatment of functional equivalents should maintain 
that balance.”54 It also embraces what has been called the principle 
of “prescriptive parallelism,” which conveys the notion that “the 
traditional copyright balance of rights and exceptions should be 
preserved in the digital environment.”55 In particular, Abella and 
Moldaver JJ emphasize that their application of the technological 
neutrality principle is consistent with the recognition, in Théberge, 
of the “limited nature” of creators’ rights and the inefficiency 
of “overcompensating creators.” Commitment to technological 
neutrality in effect is thus presented as a principled means by which 
to maintain the appropriate balance between owners and users in 
the digital environment; it follows that attributing insufficient weight 
to technological neutrality can tip the balance too far in favour of 
owners’ rights, to the detriment of the public interest. With this, 
the majority in ESA invokes an expansive version of technological 
neutrality as an overarching policy consideration that should inform 
the interpretation and application of copyright law in continuing 
pursuit of its broader public policy goals. 
3.3  Putting Technological Neutrality to Work in the Copyright 
Pentalogy
My final aim in Part 3 is to demonstrate how the varying conceptions 
of technological neutrality and its role informed the interpretation and 
application of the legal provisions at issue. The principle was invoked 
to achieve three somewhat distinct ends: to extend the protection of 
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owners’ rights into new technological contexts; to ensure the equal 
availability of users’ rights in new technological contexts; and to restrict 
the extension of owners’ rights into new technological contexts. As 
illustrated below, these results roughly map onto the somewhat 
distinct approaches to technological neutrality identified in Part 
3.2 above: the minimal approach, stressing non-discrimination; the 
functional approach, stressing equivalent effect; and the teleological 
approach, stressing the broader copyright balance. 
Figure 1. Approaches to technological neutrality.
Extending 
Owners’ Rights:
•  Robertson (Majority) 
[restrictive];
•  ESA (Minority)
[restrictive];
•  Rogers [intermediate].
Extending 
Users’ Rights:
•  Bell [intermediate].
Limiting 
Owners’ Rights:
•  ESA (Majority) 
[expansive];
•  Robertson (Minority) 
[expansive]
Intermediate:
•  Effects-oriented;
•  Non-discrimination 
between functionally 
equivalent 
technologies;
•  
•  
The law operates 
consistently across 
different media;
Where consistent with 
statutory language..
Expansive:
•  Purpose-oriented;
•  Substantive non-discrimination 
between functional equivalents;
•  The law preserves the appropriate 
balance of rights and interests in 
the digital realm;
•  Guided by teleological 
interpretation of statute within 
principled framework.
Restrictive:
•  Means-oriented;
•  Formal non-
discrimination 
between 
technologies;
•  The law continues 
to apply in 
different media;
•  Subject to statute.
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 3.3.1 Extending Owners’ Rights 
Both Rogers and ESA were concerned with the scope and 
application of the section 3(1)(f) right of the copyright owner to 
“communicate the work by telecommunication.” In Rogers, the 
question was whether music streamed over the Internet to individual 
end users is a communication “to the public” within the meaning of 
section 3(1)(f). ESA was concerned with whether downloading video 
games that include musical works is a “communication” at all. In both 
cases, technological neutrality was raised as a basis for extending the 
protection of owners’ rights into the online environment. 
The communication right has been described as “one of the most 
clearly technology indifferent legal provisions” in the ICT field.56 In 
Canada, as Rothstein J explains, the previous “technology-specific 
communication right” that attached to “radiocommunication” was 
amended in 1988 to the “neutral language [of ‘telecommunication’] to 
encompass evolving but then unknown technological advances.”57 Yet, 
what we see in these cases is that, given the significant difference in 
the nature of offline and online communication methods, technology-
indifferent laws do not necessarily render extraneous a technology-
neutralizing interpretation.58 As Shira Perlmutter has observed: 
[E]ven rights deliberately written to be technologically 
neutral are quickly called into question by the rapidity 
of today’s technological developments. There enures a 
tremendous diversion of time and energy in debating 
the precise borders of each right. Which rights are 
implicated by a particular type of dissemination—for 
example, “making available” online? Reproduction? 
Distribution? Rental? Communication?59 
Rothstein J and the minority in ESA were of the view that the 
communication right is implicated when works are downloaded over 
the Internet.60 A means-oriented and formal non-discrimination 
approach to technological neutrality might suggest that discriminating 
between transmissions of electronic downloads and streamed 
transmissions is contrary to the basic principle. However, seen from 
a more substantive and effects-oriented perspective, the minority’s 
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reasoning can be admonished for falling afoul of Tussey’s second 
rule of thumb—focusing on the technical details of the technologies 
at issue. By directing the inquiry toward the system specifics (the 
technical means of transmission) rather than the outcome of that 
technical process (the acquisition of a copy), the minority could be 
accused of pinning its judgment on “technological details rather 
than lasting principles governing rights and liabilities.”61 More 
importantly, satisfied with the “ordinary” meaning of the neutral term 
“communication” and its application to downloads by virtue of their 
“transmission,”62 the minority also falls afoul of Tussey’s third rule: 
its focus is on the black letter law, largely unencumbered, it would 
seem, by a concern with the effect of capturing downloads within the 
communication right—the substantive inequality produced between 
traditional and online distribution systems, and the resultant impact 
on copyright’s fragile balance. Attentive primarily to the need to secure 
protection for owners across new technologies, the minority’s reasons 
relegate consideration of the broader role of technological neutrality 
in securing consistency in effect and preserving the appropriate 
policy balance.
In Rogers, communication “to the public” was held to include 
“a series of point-to-point communications of the same work to an 
aggregation of individuals” on the grounds that “it matters little for the 
purposes of copyright protection whether the members of the public 
receive the communication in the same or in different places, at the 
same or at different times or at their own or the sender’s initiative.”63 The 
Court emphasized the technology-neutral language of the amended 
statutory provision64 and found, in the expanded scope of section 
3(1)(f), “evidence that the Act has evolved to ensure its continued 
relevance in an evolving technological environment.” Thus, the 
Court determined that limiting the communication rights to “push-
technologies” and so excluding “pull-technologies” would be 
“inconsistent with the neutral language of the Act itself.”65 The extension 
of neutral statutory language to afford protection in relation to online 
streaming is a good example of a non-discrimination approach at 
work, ensuring that the law does not discriminate between traditional 
broadcast and Internet communications, the effects of which are viewed 
as essentially equivalent. The approach is also in line with Tussey’s second 
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recommendation: that courts avoid technology-centred judgments 
and interpret copyright’s core concepts in terms applicable across 
technologies.66 Taking this non-discrimination approach, technological 
neutrality was employed to extend owners’ right to “communicate to 
the public” into a new technological context where communications 
occur at a place and time chosen individually by end users. 
 3.3.2 Extending Users’ Rights 
As Cameron Hutchinson has observed, the most significant 
aspect of the Bell case in regard to technological neutrality is the 
explicit extension, for the first time, of the principle beyond the rights 
of copyright owners to the rights of users.67 The issue before the Court 
was whether the streaming of short extracts or “previews” of musical 
works could benefit from the fair dealing defence. SOCAN argued 
that the “amount” of the dealing was unfair in light of the aggregate 
quantity of music heard through previews by consumers. Invoking the 
principle of technological neutrality, the Court held that the relevant 
amount is rather the proportion of each extract to the whole work 
(thus supporting the finding of fair dealing for research purposes). 
The Court explained:
[G]iven the ease and magnitude with which digital 
works are disseminated over the Internet, focusing on 
the “aggregate” amount of the dealing in cases involving 
digital works could well lead to disproportionate 
findings of unfairness when compared with non-
digital works. If…large-scale organized dealings are 
inherently unfair, most of what online service providers 
do with musical works would be treated as copyright 
infringement. This…potentially undermines the goal of 
technological neutrality….68 
The “intermediate version” of technological neutrality articulated 
in Bell, which was focused on consistent operation of the law across 
technologies, allowed the principle to expand from preserving 
owners’ rights in new environments to preserving the rights of users 
to deal fairly. While online dealings may well be different in scale 
than their offline equivalents (and the “character” of such dealing 
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may weigh against finding fairness), the Court was alert to the risk 
that assuming (or even double-counting) unfairness based on the 
potential scale or aggregate volume of digital dealings could effectively 
render the fair dealing defence severely weakened or even eviscerated 
in the online environment. Such a result would be contrary to the 
more substantive vision of technological neutrality as concerned 
with achieving consistency in the effect of the law when applied 
in different technological contexts. As the Court recognized, the 
effects of copyright law depend not only on the continued protection 
of owners’ rights, but also on the continued recognition of their 
appropriate limits.
 3.3.3 Restricting the Reach of Owners’ Rights 
It should come as no surprise, however, that it is with the ESA case, 
where the majority offered the most expansive version of technological 
neutrality as a guiding principle, that we see its most prominent and 
potentially impactful use. Finding that digital downloads implicated 
only the reproduction right and not the communication right, 
which has historically been linked to public performance, Abella 
and Moldaver JJ focused on “what the internet technology was 
functionally doing as opposed to how it was technically doing it.”69 
The majority thus explained: “Although a download and a stream are 
both ‘transmissions’ in technical terms (they both use ‘data packet 
technology’), they are not both ‘communications’ for the purposes of 
the Copyright Act…. Unlike a download, the experience of a stream is 
much more akin to a broadcast or performance.”70 
The importance of differentiating downloading from streaming 
activities—while justified through an analysis of legislative history71 
and a (somewhat controversial) interpretation of section 3(1)72—
was clearly motivated by an overarching concern with the practical 
consequences of finding otherwise. If, as SOCAN argued, the activity 
of downloading a copy of a video game can infringe on both the 
reproduction and the communication right, the effect is to permit 
“double-dipping” by copyright owners,73 requiring the payment of two 
fees to two separate collective societies.74 This result was dismissed as 
inefficient, and therefore harmful to “both end users and copyright 
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owners.”75 Moreover, it was explicitly criticized for “ignor[ing] 
the principle of technological neutrality.”76 The majority reasoned 
that permitting such double dipping in respect of copies delivered 
through the Internet would “effectively impose a gratuitous cost for 
the use of more efficient, Internet-based technologies,” as compared 
with delivery through stores or by mail. Informed by its version of 
technological neutrality, then, the majority opted quite deliberately to 
interpret the Act “in a way that avoids imposing an additional layer 
of protections and fees based solely on the method of delivery of the 
work to the end user.”77 
This use of the principle is interesting in two respects. First, 
as noted, the result is to discriminate between two kinds of online 
activities—streaming and downloading—and, in doing so, to overlook 
the technical means employed for both kinds of transmissions (data 
packet transmission that is not a “single activity” in any technical 
sense). This approach might be thought to undermine technological 
neutrality insofar as it distinguishes between technical processes and 
imposes legal consequences for using one form of transmission over 
another. Such a critique would have to rely, however, on a formal non-
discrimination–based vision of the principle. Thus, Rothstein J and 
the minority warn against “limit[ing] the scope of the communication 
right when it is applied to one such new technology.”78 However, 
taking a substantive approach concerned with functional equivalence 
and discriminatory effect, I would suggest, the majority’s conclusion 
is well supported and eminently defensible. Protecting an additional 
income stream for digital downloads that is not available for hard 
copy sales is essentially the opposite of technological neutrality, thus 
understood.79
Second, the majority’s ruling and reasons signal a willingness 
to actively limit the potential reach of the ostensibly technology-
neutral rights of copyright owners in new technological contexts 
in recognition of the broader policy balance implicated by owners’ 
claims. In this vein, the minority takes a legally formalist stance and 
criticizes the majority for “reading into the Act restrictions which are 
not apparent from and are even inconsistent with the current language 
of the Act.”80 According to Rothstein J, by “inferring limits into the 
communication right,” the majority ruling went “beyond the function 
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of the courts.”81 Indeed, the ruling has proved controversial precisely 
because the Court could easily have accorded “communication by 
telecommunication” its readily available and previously attributed 
meaning,82 and thereby protected the rights of owners to demand 
public performance fees for every digital transmission of their works. 
Instead, as Professor Hutchinson explains, the majority 
presented technological neutrality as a “principle of non-interference” 
when it sought to “avoid imposing copyright liability on technologies 
and activities that, while theoretically capable of being included under 
the Act, only incidentally implicate copyright.”83 In doing so, the Court 
took a more activist stance, unapologetically curtailing owners’ rights 
in the digital environment in the name of technological neutrality, 
thereby insulating the users of new technologies from potential 
(and doctrinally justifiable) liability—an interpretive approach 
with potentially significant consequences for future demands for 
online copyright protection.84 While the expansive version of the 
technological neutrality principle might equally support extending 
copyright or protecting user rights in particular contexts, it is only in 
this expansive form that the principle has thus far been employed to 
actively delimit owner rights. 
4.  The Promise of the Technological Neutrality Principle
Having charted the various definitions and rationales offered in 
respect of the principle of technological neutrality, and their bearing 
on the interpretation and application of the law, I want to offer, in the 
final section, some brief thoughts about the justification and potential 
implications of the principle as it emerged, fully formed, from the 
ESA case. 
4.1  On Justifications
To the extent that technological neutrality can be derived directly 
from the face of the Copyright Act, it is generally found in the wording 
of section 3(1) and the owner’s exclusive right to reproduce the work 
“in any material form whatsoever.” This provision undoubtedly 
demonstrates an ambition toward a technologically neutral copyright 
but, in itself, it demands nothing more than extending the reach of 
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owners’ rights to new media, thereby ensuring non-discrimination 
in the applicability of the law to different technologies, and, to a 
certain degree, “future-proofing” the law. What we see in ESA is a 
markedly broader, functional vision of technological neutrality as a 
guiding principle that actively distinguishes between technological 
means and restricts copyright’s reach in new contexts with a view to 
achieving consistency in effect; so, if not in the language of the Act, 
where can the principle, in this form, find its origin and justification? 
The answer, I suggest, is simple and lies in the overarching policy 
goals of the copyright system as articulated by the Supreme Court in 
the Théberge case.
In Théberge, writing for the majority, Binnie J stated that 
copyright requires “a balance between promoting the public interest 
in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and 
intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator.”85 In Bell, Abella J 
explained the significance of the case:
Théberge reflected a move away from an earlier, author-
centric view which focused on the exclusive right of 
authors and copyright owners to control how their 
works were used in the marketplace…. Théberge focused 
attention instead on the importance copyright plays in 
promoting the public interest, and emphasized that the 
dissemination of artistic works is central to developing a 
robustly cultured and intellectual public domain. …  
[B]oth protection and access must be sensitively 
balanced in order to achieve this goal.86
This principled recognition of copyright as requiring a sensitive 
public policy balance, rather than simply the protection of a 
private property right, has had a marked impact on the landscape 
of Canadian copyright law. If copyright in general requires this 
balance, then it must surely follow that copyright in the digital era 
requires the preservation of this balance, which must mean that the 
law should have the same effect (produce a similar balance of rights 
and interests) whether applied offline or online. The broad principle 
of technological neutrality, as employed by the majority in ESA, 
therefore flows naturally from the Court’s recognition of the Théberge 
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balance and its continued significance in the digital environment. 
Correspondingly, as one might expect, the most limited version 
of technological neutrality, as employed by the minority in ESA, 
aligns with a restrictive vision of balance and its role in guiding the 
interpretation of the law. Citing the same statement of balance from 
Théberge, Rothstein J continues: “While the ‘courts should strive 
to maintain an appropriate balance between these two goals,’…[i]n 
Canada, copyright [remains] a creature of statute.”87 Neither balance 
nor technological neutrality, from this viewpoint, offers a basis 
for “delimit[ing] the scope of broadly defined rights in the digital 
environment”; rather, this task is properly left to Parliament, which 
will “legislate when it considers copyright protection to be improperly 
balanced.”88
With respect, Rothstein J appears to permit the principle of 
balance to inform the extension of owners’ rights into the online 
environment (protecting owners in Rogers), but not to limit owners’ 
rights (in Robertson and ESA). My argument is that, if one begins with 
a commitment to the principle of balance as articulated in Théberge, 
then it should follow as a matter of course that the balance must be 
preserved as technologies evolve; this, in turn, demands a principle 
of technological neutrality that focuses on the effects on the law in 
new technological contexts, and that justifies (in Koops’s terms) a 
functionalist or teleological interpretation of the law with a view to 
the substantive principles at stake.89 In Tussey’s terms, technological 
neutrality is necessarily furthered by consideration of copyright’s 
broader policy goals, rather strict adherence to the black letter law.90 
The important point is that technological neutrality, as presented by 
the majority in ESA, is not a new and overarching policy parachuted 
into Canadian copyright law; rather, it is a principled interpretive tool 
mandated by the overarching policy of Canada’s copyright law—the 
preservation or continuing pursuit of an appropriate balance between 
protecting authors and promoting the public interest. As Tomas 
Lipinski writes, “The overall goal of balance in the copyright law 
between rights of copyright owners and copyright users is paramount 
and the concept of technological neutrality in the application of the 
law assists in achieving that goal.”91
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4.2 On Implications
If there is anything on which everyone can agree, it would seem to 
be that the Court’s invocation of technological neutrality in ESA is 
of potentially enormous significance when it comes to interpreting 
and applying the Copyright Act as amended by the Copyright 
Modernization Act. Exactly what significance the principle will have, 
however, and what outcomes it might produce, are less evident and 
more open to debate. As Michael Geist has argued, “the linkage 
between technological neutrality and the limited nature of creators’ 
rights could prove very significant as the court is concerned that a 
non-neutral approach may result in overcompensating creators.”92 
With this as a potential starting point, the general assumption seems 
to be that, for better or for worse, the principle may be employed 
to restrict the scope of the owner rights that have been created or 
expanded by the new Act. 
The new Act contains a large volume of technologically specific 
provisions that would appear to be inherently at odds with the guiding 
principle of technological neutrality as a regulatory strategy. It should 
be recalled, however, that as a principle of regulation, technology 
specificity is the opposite of technology independence; technology-
specific regulations may thus be said to be technologically neutral if 
it is claimed that they differentiate between technologies with legally 
relevant differences. In such instances, different treatment may be 
“necessary to realize an equivalent result.”93 Thus, the additional 
protection of digital rights management (DRM) systems, for example, 
is identified by Koops as “a technology-specific or technology-driven 
regulation, which aims to create the same copyright-law effect in 
the on-line era as it had in the off-line era.”94 Such protection may 
therefore be claimed to be functional (in the sense of Koops’s A1), by 
attempting to reinstate the norms of the analog world in the digital 
environment through a combination of technology and law. Koops 
explains: 
[T]he advent of new technologies has threatened to shift 
the power balance between copyright owners and users 
to make users more powerful: they can cheaply and 
without limit make perfect copies, which formerly they 
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could not do. Thus, the law reacts by shifting the power 
balance back towards copyright holders: it prohibits the 
circumvention of DRM systems.95 
But as Koops rightly warns, “[w]hether it achieves that aim is 
another matter; the power balance is now arguably tipped deeper 
towards copyright holders than it has ever done before.”96 Indeed, 
even the premise that new technologies represent a net threat to 
copyright owners (never mind the appropriate legal response) is 
open to dispute. As Lipinski notes, “those who have control of a 
technologically dependent medium, the digital medium for example, 
in fact control both the ownership and the access to the work, without 
heed to users’ rights.” Rather than neutrality, then, Lipinski perceives 
in digital environments “the ascendancy of ownership rights.”97 
It might be claimed that the technology-specific provisions of the 
Copyright Modernization Act are aimed at ensuring the continuing 
application and enforcement of copyright in the digital environment, 
with the intention that “what holds offline should also hold online.” 
Certainly, it seems fair to say that copyright’s balance “can no longer 
be purely internal to the legal framework of rights and limitations 
but must factor in elements of practical reality, including the impact 
of the additional risks engendered, and the additional protection 
made possible by technology.”98 Even rationalized in these terms, 
however, many of the technology-specific provisions exemplify 
the distortive potential of such efforts, especially when guided by a 
primary concern to protect the rights of copyright owners against the 
increased risk associated with the digital environment. By focusing 
on the perceived threat to copyright owners presented by digital 
technologies, Canada’s legislature has enacted technology-specific 
laws that overcompensate owners and tip the balance in their favour. 
In particular, the additional protections afforded to digital locks (the 
technological protection measures that prevent access or certain uses 
of digital content) seem largely incapable of justification when seen 
through the lens of technological neutrality. 
On their face, of course, the provisions violate the basic 
starting point of technological neutrality insofar as they target the 
technology itself: section 41.1(1)(c), for example, makes it unlawful to 
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“manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale or rental or provide…
any technology, device or component” produced primarily for the 
purpose of circumventing a technological protection measure. Such 
device prohibitions regulate particular technologies (the means) 
rather than particular uses (the effects), discriminate between 
different technologies, and quite deliberately restrict the development 
of certain technologies. There is no sound basis on which to assert 
that the anti-circumvention provisions simply shift the balance back. 
The greatest difficulty with such an argument is that these added 
protections entirely neglect one half of the copyright balance by 
failing to safeguard in any meaningful way the rights of lawful users 
of protected works. The new Act contains no general fair dealing 
defence to circumvention liability, and no route by which to demand 
access to works for lawful purposes. By privileging digital locks and 
their protection over user rights and the public interest, the new rules 
disrupt the traditional copyright balance, “sacrificing user rights and 
privileges to the ultimate power of technical control.”99
As such, Michael Geist is right to suggest that “the biggest long 
term impact [of the ESA decision] may be felt when courts begin to 
assess the effect of the new digital lock rules. Those rules are distinctly 
non-neutral and could face a rough ride if challenged before the 
courts.”100 Geist explains, “those rules ‘impose an additional layer of 
protections’ and create ‘a gratuitous cost’ for consumers who lose their 
user rights in the shift to Internet-based technologies”—precisely the 
kinds of effects that the Court found to be contrary to its substantive 
version of the technological neutrality principle.101 
I argued above that technological neutrality is not a new principle 
suddenly imported by the Court into Canada’s copyright law; rather, 
technological neutrality is about preserving copyright’s fundamental 
balance between owners and the public as technologies evolve. By the 
same token, the digital lock protections in the Copyright Modernization 
Act do not violate the principle of technological neutrality simply 
because they are technology specific; rather, these additions to the 
rights of owners violate the principle because they fail to preserve the 
copyright balance in the digital environment. 
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With the enactment of the Copyright Modernization Act, the 
legislature has opted for an abundance of technology-specific 
provisions that establish additional protections for owners without 
corresponding protections for users. The new requirements lack 
transparency and comprehensibility for ordinary Canadians tasked 
with following the rules, and place extraordinary monitoring and 
compliance obligations on intermediaries and service providers (even 
including, for example, teachers offering distance-learning lessons). 
There is no doubt that, in doing so, the legislature has threatened 
the ability of the judiciary to keep copyright on the technologically 
neutral and balanced trajectory established by the Supreme Court 
in recent copyright jurisprudence. However, this does not minimize 
the significance of these path-breaking decisions—it suggests that 
the Court’s powerful reasoning may have come just in time to save 
Canada’s copyright balance. 
Koops writes that “within a system of functional interpretation 
of laws, technology neutrality becomes a minor issue: practice can 
deal with laws that seem technology-specific by interpreting them in 
a functional way.”102 While not always possible or sufficient to achieve 
equivalence of result, “the possibility of functional interpretation may 
often be a good way of circumventing the problem of technology 
neutrality.”103 Moreover, as Koops suggests, the effects of technology-
specific regulation can be minimized by the establishment of a clear 
framework of substantive principles such as that elucidated by the 
Supreme Court in the copyright arena over the past decade. By 
providing a clear sense of the “fundamental rights and values that are 
at stake and the rationale that underlies” Canada’s copyright system, 
the Court has established a principled framework that will, in the 
future, facilitate “the practice of interpreting…technology-specific 
laws…in a functional, teleological way.”104
It is hoped, then, that as Canadian courts grapple with the 
amended Copyright Act, and find themselves challenged with 
interpreting its dense, technology-specific provisions in new and likely 
unforeseen situations, this principled framework of rights and values 
will guide the judicial understanding and application of the law. As 
an interpretive tool, the principle of technological neutrality should 
298   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
assist in achieving consistency in the application of copyright (and its 
limits) in furtherance of copyright’s purposes. This should mean, for 
example, minimizing to the extent possible the scope and impact of 
the anti-circumvention right on non-infringing uses, thereby giving 
substance to the Court’s repeated insistence that fair dealing is a 
“users’ right” and “an essential part of furthering the public interest 
objectives of the Copyright Act.”105 Without abandoning due regard for 
the statutory language,106 courts should strive to apply the text of the 
law in a way that advances the purposes of copyright by preserving 
the balance between authors’ rights and the public interest in the 
encouragement and dissemination of works. It is unfortunate that 
elements of the newly written law do more to jeopardize than to assist 
in this task; but it is fortunate indeed that those tasked with applying 
the law can do so with the principle of technological neutrality to 
guide them as they carve out a path for copyright in this digital age. 
5.  Conclusion
The idea that technological neutrality should be a governing principle 
in the realm of copyright law has long been present in Canada, as 
elsewhere, but has gone largely unexamined until now. The Supreme 
Court’s 2012 copyright decisions shone a light on the principle and its 
potential significance in shaping the copyright law of the digital era. 
Evident in these rulings were three distinguishable conceptualizations 
of technological neutrality: a minimalist version focused on formal 
non-discrimination and the extension of rights into new media; an 
intermediate version concerned with functional equivalence and 
consistency of effect in the application of copyright to new media; 
and an expansive version—extending beyond any previous judicial 
treatment of the principle in Canada or elsewhere—that demands a 
teleological interpretation of the law aimed at advancing the purposes 
of the copyright system as the technological landscape shifts. With 
these decisions, technological neutrality emerged as a fundamental 
and functional principle that can inform the application of copyright 
law in important and arguably unanticipated ways. Not only can it 
explain the extension of copyright protection into new technological 
contexts, but it can also be asserted as a safeguard of user rights 
and their availability in respect of novel technologically facilitated 
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consumer practices. Most importantly, however, the principle 
supports circumscribing the potential reach of existing owners’ rights 
where their extension threatens to upset copyright’s fragile balance in 
the digital domain. 
The unprecedented power of technological neutrality to shape 
the contours of copyright protection therefore depends on an 
understanding of the principle that extends beyond simple non-
discrimination in the application of copyright norms to new media. 
Rather, its power flows from a substantive commitment to the 
notion that copyright law should apply with equivalent purpose and 
effect across the technological landscape. Taking seriously the idea 
of copyright as a balance between authors and the public reveals 
the principle to be ultimately concerned with the preservation of 
this copyright balance in the digital environment. As such, the 
technological neutrality principle does not occupy a separate or 
parallel position alongside the guiding principle of balance—it is 
part and parcel of that balance. Its significance, then, will not be 
determined by the mere acceptance of technological neutrality as 
an ideal. As evidenced by the various iterations and applications of 
the principle by the Justices of the Supreme Court, the significance 
of technological neutrality will ultimately depend on the meaning 
and significance that we accord to the public policy objectives of our 
copyright system. 
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